A significant body of research, primarily carried out in North American contexts, has shed light on social forces that shape various population categories within the realm of human genetic/genome knowledge production (Duster, 2003 (Duster, , 2006a (Duster, , 2006b Fullwiley 2007; Hinterberger 2010 Hinterberger , 2012 and shown that human "populations" are "both the production and outcomes of these [genome-wide association] studies" (Fujimura and Rajagopalan 2010: 17) . This chapter attempts to contribute to this growing body of literature by illustrating political and social forces shaping the coproduction of science and social order in a transnational setting. 1 In particular I explore how a group of eminent human geneticists in Asia analyze and interpret human genome variation through a pan-Asian framework. Thus, while Hardy et al. (2008) and Benjamin (2009) have elaborated on the social implications of the notion of "genomic [national] sovereignty," I look at the formation and operation of a region-based category within human genome variation studies and explore its significance.
Over the past decade advances in work in human genomics in Asia have been rapid and expanding. In 2009 the Pan-Asian SNP Consortium (PASNP), a transnational research team within the Human Genome Organization (HUGO), mapped genetic variation and migration patterns in 75 populations, with data from 11 countries: Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, (p.224) Malaysia, and India. The primary conclusion, that "there is substantial genetic proximity of SEA [Southeast Asian] and EA [East Asian] populations," was presented in "Mapping Human Genetic Diversity in Asia," published in Science (HUGO PanAsian SNP Consortium et al. 2009 ). In alluding to this genetic proximity while excluding Australia, this high-impact publication seemed to lend support to the argument that "Asian" is a coherent racial category. Indeed Edison Liu, then president of the PASNP, was asked to reflect on the publication and was quoted as saying, "When we found out that all of humanity was derived from a migration out of Africa, it reversed centuries of Eurocentrism. That all Asians probably came through South-east Asia and migrated northward, once again brings us closer together, conceptually, as one people" (Singh 2009). I review this premise and analyze the contents of science along with the contexts of the production of scientific knowledge. The primary question I raise is How have regional networks of scientists transformed epistemological contents of science? Drawing on interviews with leading geneticists in the HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium, and on documentary analysis, I illustrate the transnational dimension of the usage of the "Asian" category in human genetic variation studies and suggest that the PASNP's work engages a dynamic tension that simultaneously undermines (for some) and reifies (for others) the biological bases of socially constructed notions of race and ethnicity.
Academic Regionalism and the Study of Human Genetic Variation in a Transnational Context
Regionalism, Globalization, and Counterhegemonic Transnational Networks
While this chapter deals with a specific case of a regional network in science, it is important to understand the larger picture of the nature and character of the regionalist project and its relationship to globalization. Ching (2000: 237) articulated the political economy of regionalism in his analysis of popular culture in the age of late capitalism and persuasively argued that "regionalism is an essential constituent of globalization rather than a systemic effect." In particular "regionalism in the late twentieth century . . . emphasizes the inescapable contradiction between the immanent logic of capital and the historical formation of nationalized economies." As Ching explained:
Capital itself is, or has always been, potentially transnational. As long as surplus value can be extracted, theoretically there is no reason why capital needs to remain national or even multinational. Historically, however, capitalist development . . . had to take root in a nationalized economy. (2000: 239) further suggested that regionalist projects should be seen as "ideological formations" and regionalism as "a set of contending discourses" that is (p.225) "always directed against another territorial discourse (the world system, nationalism, or other regionalisms)."
Ching
In analyzing economic globalization, Evans (2000) identified transnational networks-which he termed "counterhegemonic" transnational networks-with an emphasis on challenging the economic and ideological domination of transnational corporations. In particular counterhegemonic transnational networks "are efforts to constrain the power of global elites, both by pushing for different rules and by building different ideological understandings" (231). Such networks include, for example, transnational advocacy networks, transnational consumer networks, and transnational labor movements.
While Ching (2000) and Evans (2000) clarified the relationship among globalization, regionalism, and counterhegemonic transnational networks with reference to economic capital, I contend that a similar dynamic exists with respect to science. That is to say, scientific knowledge itself is potentially transnational, but historically such knowledge production took root in a nationalist framework. As such, regionalist projects of scientific collaboration emerge as a mediatory mechanism of control that scientists in specific nation-states initiate in order to control and regulate knowledge production, particularly when such entails material consequences (such as professional publications and biomedical industry formation, to give just two examples). In addition, drawing on Evans (2000), in a parallel fashion one can suggest that there are counterhegemonic transnational networks in the field of science.
"Emergence" and Coproduction in Human Genome Science
To begin with, as Duster (2006b: 434) pointed out, It is possible to make arbitrary groupings of populations defined by geography, language, self-identified faiths, other-identified physiognomy, and so on, and still find statistically significant allelic variations between those groupings. . . . When researchers claim to be able to assign people to groups based on allele frequency at a certain number of loci, they have chosen loci that show differences between the groups they are trying to distinguish.
In other words, such groupings-even when they are social rather than biological-can be molecularized in the laboratory, and it is critical to understand how and why scientists decide to define a population group in a specific way. Indeed while one often hears that science and society are coproduced, as Reardon (2011: 327) These groundbreaking studies-primarily carried out in North American contexts-showed us the ways in which racial differences are constructed within human genome science. While these studies were attentive to national and global contexts of the practice of science, few incorporated regionallevel factors in their analysis.
In addition a conventional idea distinguishes the notion of "race" from the notion of "ethnicity. Race is a socially constructed attribute that is tied to beliefs about differences in the physical makeup of different individuals. Ethnicity is different. When most people speak of "ethnic differences," they are referring specifically to cultural differences. Thus, ethnicity has to do with shared cultural heritage.
In the paragraphs that follow, I draw on interview data to show how ethnicity and race became equivalent in the PASNP's work and that ethnicity was given genetic attributes. In other words, the way population is defined and operationalized by human genome scientists is likely to usher in an era of population-based medicine (Kahn 2013).
Asian Scientists in Asia I am interested in how self-identified Asian scientists located in a regional network in Asia define and operationalize human genome diversity. As investments in education and research in Asia have risen in recent years, scientists with Asian backgrounds but trained in Europe and the United States have been returning to Asia, as the following statistics indicate:
• About 80,000 Western-trained scientists have returned to China to work in academia or industry since the mid-1980s.
The reason for this is the outpouring of investment by the Chinese government and private industry intended to help China to be a leader in the pharmaceutical and healthcare industry by 2020.
(p.228)
• In an analysis of 116 survey responses of Japanese researchers living in the United States, 31% planned to work in Japan in the future, while 50% stated that it depends on circumstances; the most important circumstance was to be able to obtain a permanent position with a university/research institute.
• In a comparative survey of self-identified Korean scientists, 838 of 1,981 responded. The responses were classified by PhD year; before 1970, 1970-1979, 1980-1987 (p.229) I draw on interviews with leading participants involved in the emergence of the HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium. As Alejandro Portes, Luis E. Guarnizo, and Patricia Landolt (1999: 220) suggested:
We believe that a study that begins with the history and activities of individuals is the most efficient way of learning about institutional underpinnings of transnationalism and its structural effects. From data collection based on individual interviews, it then becomes possible to delineate the networks that make transnational enterprises possible.
The interviews were conducted in 2011 and 2012, and interviewees were assured of confidentiality. Thus the names in this chapter are pseudonyms. All interviews lasted approximately one to one and half hours and were recorded and transcribed. Interviewees included the following:
• Dr. Zhang, a self-identified Chinese geneticist and a founding member of the HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium
• Dr. Sato, a self-identified Japanese geneticist and a founding member of the HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium
• Dr. Kang, a self-identified South Korean geneticist and a key member of the HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium
• Dr. Lee, a self-identified Chinese geneticist, a selfidentified Chinese geneticist, and a key member of the HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium.
Main Themes in the Interview Data
Four main themes emerged in the analysis of the opinions of key geneticists in the PASNP Consortium: (1) there is a need to recognize the genetic diversity of the "Asian" population in clinical trials in the United States, and that diversity is a function of comparisons; (2) ethnicity was used as a basis to start the population variation study, in contrast to the disease study; (3) the way the consortium identified genetic diversity was through "ethnicity," as defined by local geneticists; (4) a reaction to Eurocentrism underpins the pride of emerging Asian players in genome science, and a host-guest relationship was adopted as a framework to overcome issues of hegemony within Asia. In other words, based on the perceived genetic basis of ethnicity among Asians, the development of medicine for different ethnic groups becomes possible.
The second major theme in the interviews is that ethnicity was used as a proxy for genetic diversity as an attempt to solve the problems of a disease-orientation study design and to navigate around the issue of national genomic sovereignty. Genomewide association studies (GWAS), in general, seek to define genetic variation associated with disease susceptibility where more than one area of the genome is implicated or may have a modest effect. clinician. And it wasn't going to be just one clinician, it was going to be many hospitals.
There are many different healthcare systems. You can't do that in Vietnam, because their healthcare is not great. And then you have political problems because you have to deal with many different hospitals and different doctors. . . . Those countries with aspirations in genetics, most of the research was funded in Asia by trade and industry, not by health. Or if it is by education, it usually has an industrial KPI (Key Performance Indicators). So no country wanted to give their genetic treasure to Japan so that they would have a patent on the diagnostic. It's an issue of where your funding comes from.
So for those reasons, the negotiations in effect broke down. Nobody could mount it, it cost too much, the political forces, whether it was funding or otherwise, were too powerful that the disease orientation, though it is the major reason we do what we do, okay, was just not going to happen.
To put it succinctly, political, logistical, and financial factors have dictated the failure of disease-oriented study. For example, while Japan is technologically competent, no countries were forthcoming in sharing their genetic materials with the Japanese. Recruiting clinicians and hospitals presented another formidable obstacle. Finally, the research for treatment of diseases, which are a public health issue, is largely funded by industry rather than public health institutions in Asia.
The shift in focus was motivated not only by the complexity of a disease-oriented design but also by the practicability of the population diversity design, as Dr. Zhang explained:
The first thing when I realised what was happening, I started to talk to key players, to suggest that we move away from disease and do population genetics, which has a much easier design. You don't have to have cases and controls, you just basically have people's DNA. As long as you know what dialect they speak and who their grandparents are, which virtually everybody can tell you. Furthermore you don't need big numbers, you just need to have diversity, because it's a sampling issue. . . . In actual fact it doesn't matter how many people you have in your country. It matters more how diverse they are. So countries like Thailand and Indonesia and India became much more important than Korea and Japan [because there are more ethnic groups in Thailand, Indonesia, and India than in Korea and Japan]. So the ease of (p.234) design was a key driver. The other aspect of this was that the information would be useful. It's not essential, but it would be very useful to geneticists to know the diversity of Asian variation. . . . We put a framework and the framework was that we don't do disease, we do diversity. We look at and very specifically, what is common amongst Asians and what is our greatest variants. And politically it's arguing that it's the commonality of humanity.
In sum, it was a practical matter: the decision to move from a disease-oriented study design to a population diversity study without the disease as an end point. Obtaining samples for the population diversity study is easier, particularly when one assumes that ethnic diversity represents genetic diversity.
However, as noted above, the interviews demonstrated that there is no one coherent definition of ethnicity, but varied local interpretations. As shown in Dr. Zhang's interview, the term ethnicity draws no consensus:
So we [the HUGO PASNP Consortium members] had a discussion. How do you define an ethnic group? . . . We decided we won't define. We will have the scientists define an ethnic group. Because they know best how to define an ethnic group.
He went on to explain ethnicity as a surrogate for diversity and highlighted country variations:
We need in the first instance, the ability to sample across this diversity space. To do that, we use ethnicity as a surrogate, and ethnicity is defined locally by language and geographical localization, and then lastly, race.
INTERVIEWER:
What do you mean? On the same note, Dr. Kang and Dr. Sato also provided a local basis for defining ethnicity.
Dr. Kang: The way we define the Koreans were at that time, people who had three generations of knowledge that they have been in Korea, no (p.235) external influence, and people who are from two cities, one called Ansung, the other one Ansan. . . . We took the original samples from a previous study in Korea, Korean Study, so they collected this. So essentially they just defined geographically, these two cities.
Dr. Sato: Usually we consider about three generations back . . . or just ask the person if your father, mother, grandparents reside in the same area. Not very complicated. Because Japan has not much immigrants in recent years.
In summary, ethnicity is a locally defined term. Chinese can be divided by the language they speak. In Singapore ethnicity refers to different races, including Chinese, Indian, and Malay; in South Korea, Korean can be defined by residential status of three generations in two cities, Ansung and Ansan. A similar observation is made for Japan, where people can be differentiated by three generations living in the same area.
While the third theme in the interviews indicates competing definitions of ethnicity in Asia, the fourth revealed a taken-forgranted "Asian" solidarity that served as a rallying point against the Eurocentrism of prevailing scientific discourse. Dr. Zhang: The idea [of the host-guest relationship] solved the problem of chain of custody of the DNA. So a country like Indonesia, which didn't have these technical capabilities, the scientists would carry the DNA with them to a host nation. And so the host nation says two things. Number one, I will do it, the genotyping, and I will pay for it and I will teach you how to do it. And in order to really take the lead, Singapore volunteered, and turns out that Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia all used us as their host.
Actually, even Philippines came to Singapore, so basically, we were the major hosts. Then there's nothing left, right? Koreans had some Mongolians, the Chinese had some central Asians, the Indians had the great diversity of themselves, but in actual fact Singapore played the major role.
Yeah, we played the major role. But here's the thing. The ingredients are, number one, Singapore played the role that Brussels plays in the EU. It's a neutral, small, nonthreatening, you know-so if Japan wanted to lead it, the Japanese-Koreans would have a problem, and if China wanted to lead it, some others would have a problem [emphasis mine]. So Singapore was a neutral body, and they accepted that. The second part of it was, it was structured so that even the people who were least enabled to do the science were equal partners. Two things, those who were least enabled tended to be people with the greatest diversity of samples, so they were valuable. The second is that this was a win-win situation: they brought samples, they didn't relinquish any control, but they learned how to do the work. (p.236)
A concrete example of the positive in this is in both Malaysia and the Philippines. Philippines in particular because of this relationship and because of their success, and because of what they learned, the government actually put money in to set up a genetic infrastructure for Philippines to look into indigenous questions. In Malaysia, because we had a high-impact publication, the Malaysians decided to put in their hands a significant amount of money in genomics, so that they're now more or less independent in terms of doing genome sequencing. So it really did catalyse these things. So for example, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Singapore is more emerged, developed already. But India, and Pakistan, all these countries, instead of being left out, which has always happened in the past by the Western, you know, countries and researchers. Now they feel that they are also in the mainstream. So we have our own genomic community in Asia, at least PASNP. So we have this fabric, a network. Although the actual outcomes aren't so significant yet, definitely we laid the foundation, in Malaysia and definitely in Korea as well. Although the success was fairly moderate, there was indeed huge progress making these emerging Asian countries, poor, not so poor, or rich Asian countries embracing these technologies.
The host-guest framework invented by the HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium, and the ethnicity-based sampling, together 
(p.237) Conclusion and Discussion
Drawing upon semistructured interviews with leading human geneticists who participate in the Hugo Pan-Asian Consortium, I have provided a sketch of the role of race and ethnicities in the Consortium's genomic work at different stages. Four recurring themes are highlighted: (1) diversity, defined by local ethnic categories, provides a framework for pursuing potential drug discoveries; (2) there is no consensus concerning the term ethnicity; it is defined by local participating scientists; (3) ethnicity was used as a basis to start the population variation study, in contrast to a disease study; (4) Eurocentrism underpins the pride of emerging Asian players in genome science, and the host-guest relationship was adopted as a framework to overcome issues of hegemony within Asia.
These findings suggest that the Consortium's work has the potential to simultaneously undermine and reify the biological bases of traditional notions of race and ethnicity. The Consortium's remarkable achievements to date are partly a function of its pointing out the limits of Eurocentrism coupled with the domination of North American hegemony in human genome science. On one hand, it is encouraging to see the emergence of historically disadvantaged groups playing an active role in reshaping the playing field of science. On the other hand, this can be problematic because of the acceptance of "Asian" as a proper starting point and the use of ethnicity as a proxy for clinically meaningful genetic diversity. More specifically these interviews show that the scientists are in agreement that it is incorrect to treat "Asian" as one genetically homogeneous group for clinical trials. As an alternative they have proposed using ethnicity as the basis for dividing the population for such trials. In my view this is also a sociopolitical minefield, because ethnicity is a sociopolitical construct that varies by region and shifting political considerations, and is not a biological concept, which, as Marks (2006) pointed out, is a far superior basis for segregating populations for medical treatment.
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